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Abstract—According to the recent rulings of the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC), TV white spaces (TVWS) can
now be accessed by secondary users (SUs) after a list of vacant TV
channels is obtained via a geo-location database. Proper business
models are therefore essential for database operators to manage
geo-location databases. Database access can be simultaneously
priced under two different schemes: the registration scheme and
the service plan scheme. In the registration scheme, the database
reserves part of the TV bandwidth for registered White Space
Devices (WSDs). In the service plan scheme, the WSDs are
charged according to their queries.
In this paper, we investigate the business model for the
TVWS database under a hybrid pricing scheme. We consider the
scenario where a database operator employs both the registration
scheme and the service plan scheme to serve the SUs. The
SUs’ choices of different pricing schemes are modeled as a
non-cooperative game and we derive distributed algorithms to
achieve Nash Equilibrium (NE). Considering the NE of the SUs,
the database operator optimally determines pricing parameters
for both pricing schemes in terms of bandwidth reservation,
registration fee and query plans.
Index Terms—TV White Space, Geo-location Database, Pric-
ing, Game Theory, Contract Theory.
I. Introduction
Recently, the FCC has released the TVWS for secondary
access [1][2] under a database-assisted architecture, where
there are several geo-location databases providing spectrum
availability of the TV channels. These databases will be
managed by database operators (DOs) approved by the FCC.
To manage the operation costs, proper business models are
essential for DOs.
The FCC allows DOs to determine their own pricing
schemes [1] and there are two different ways in which SUs
can assess the TVWS with the help of a database. SUs can
register their WSDs in the database in a soft-licence style
[3]. Part of the available TV spectrum is then reserved for
the registered SUs [4][5]. Unregistered SUs can also access
TVWS in a purely secondary manner. For instance, an SU
can first connect to the database and upload WSD information
such as location and transmission power and then obtain a list
of available channels from the database.
As a result, two different pricing schemes can be employed,
one for registered and the other for unregistered SUs, respec-
tively. Registered SUs pay a registration fee to DOs and access
the reserved bandwidth exclusively. This pricing scheme can
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be referred to as the registration scheme. Unregistered SUs
query the database only when they are in need of TV spectrum.
DOs charge them according to the number of database queries
they make. This pricing scheme is referred to as the service
plan scheme. The co-existence of multiple pricing channels
allows DOs to better manage their costs and provides different
service qualities to different types of SUs. For example, the
registration scheme can be adopted by SUs providing rural
broadband or smart metering services, since the reserved band-
width may suffer from less severe interference. On the other
hand, the service plan scheme suits the temporary utilization
of TVWS such as home networking.
To harvest the advantages of both pricing schemes and max-
imize the profit of DOs, two challenges need to be addressed.
First, how should DOs determine pricing parameters for each
scheme? With limited available TV bandwidth, DOs need to
decide how much to allocate to each pricing channel. Also, the
registration fee in the registration scheme and the price for a
certain amount of queries should be determined. Second, how
should SUs choose between the two schemes? Both schemes
have their pros and cons for different types of SUs. The two
challenges are coupled together. The decisions of SUs on
which pricing scheme to choose can affect the profit obtained
by DOs while the pricing parameters designed by DOs ensure
SUs have different preferences for either scheme.
In this paper, we focus on DO’s hybrid pricing scheme
design considering both the registration and the service plan
scheme. To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing
works on geo-location database considering a hybrid pricing
model [13]-[16]. We consider one DO and multiple types
of SUs. The SUs can strategically choose between the two
pricing schemes. Unlike many existing works consider no SU
strategies when there exist multiple pricing schemes, in this
paper, we assume users can have their own choices other
than being directly classified into either pricing scheme. We
argue that especially for a new service like database-based
networking, users will consider seriously of the benefits from
each scheme and other players’ responses.
In this paper, we consider a two-stage pricing framework.
At Stage I, the DO announces the amount of bandwidth to be
reserved and the registration fee for the registered SUs and
then the SUs choose whether to register or not. At Stage II,
the DO announces a set of service plans for the unregistered
SUs to choose from.
For the SUs, they decide which pricing scheme to choose
given the announced pricing schemes. If the service plan
scheme is adopted, SUs should further decide one particular
plan to buy. In this paper, we consider two different SU
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2scenarios. In the non-strategic case, SUs have fixed their
pricing scheme choices. In the strategic case, SUs can compete
with each other in choosing either pricing schemes. In the later
case, the competition among the SUs is modeled with the non-
cooperative game theory since the choices of the other SUs
can affect an SU’s utility owing to the sharing of TVWS.
For the DO, the problem is to optimally allocate bandwidth
and design pricing parameters based on estimated actions
of the SUs. In this paper, we consider the DO has either
complete or incomplete information of the SUs. By complete
information, we mean that the DO knows the exact type of
each SU. The type of SU relates with its channel quality,
valuation for the spectrum et. al. In the case of incomplete
information, the DO knows only a distribution of the types. We
model the optimal service plan design problem with contract
theory. Different service plans are considered to be different
contract items and an optimal contract is determined based on
the knowledge of the SU types. To optimally choose pricing
parameters, one challenge to tackle is how the DO estimate
the possible actions of the SUs, especially for the strategic
case. There may be multiple possible equilibriums existed in
the game. We solve this challenge by exploring the nature of
our problem and propose computationally feasible algorithm
to estimate the outcome of the game.
The major contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• We propose a hybrid pricing scheme for the DO consid-
ering the heterogeneity of SUs’ types. As far as we know,
it is the first work considering hybrid pricing schemes for
TVWS database.
• We model the competition among the strategic SUs as
a non-cooperative game. We prove the existence of the
Nash Equilibrium (NE) under both the complete and
incomplete information cases. By exploring the nature of
the problem, we design computational feasible distributed
algorithms for the SUs to achieve an NE with bounded
iterations.
• We propose algorithms for the DO to optimally decide
pricing parameters. We formulate the service plan design
with contract theory and derive optimal contract items
under the complete information and sub-optimal items
for and incomplete information scenario.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the pricing framework and detailed system model.
Problem formulation is presented in Section III. In Section IV
we study the optimal pricing solution for non-strategic SUs
under the complete information scenario as a baseline case.
Then in Section V and Section VI, we consider the SUs to be
strategic players, under complete and incomplete information
scenario, respectively. Numerical results are given in Section
VII. Related works are further reviewed in Section IX. Finally,
Section X concludes the paper.
II. System Model and Pricing Framework
In this section, after an overview of the system parameters,
we introduce the big picture of the proposed pricing frame-
work. Then we further detail the model for the DO and the
SUs, respectively. Key notations are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I: Key notations in this paper.
N The number of SUs
M The number of time periods considered
ui The secondary user with index i
ai The pricing scheme selected by ui, 0: the registration scheme;
1: the service plan scheme
θi The type of ui
B The expected bandwidth of available TVWS
BR The expected bandwidth reserved for registered SUs
r The registration fee
qi The number of database queries in a query plan (qi, pi)
pi The wholesale price in the query plan (qi, pi)
µ0 The number of the registered SUs
µ1 The number of the unregistered SUs
φ0(b) The cost to reserve b bandwidth
φ1(q) The maintenance cost for q database queries
T The number of different SUs’ types
θi The i’th smallest user type
βi The percentage of SUs with type θi
γi The percentage of SUs with type θi with registration scheme
A. System Parameters
We consider the scenario with one DO and N SUs denoted
as N = {u1, u2, · · · , uN}. We assume N is public information
available to the DO and the SUs. For the ease of analysis, we
assume all the SUs are in the same contention domain [7].
FCC requires the SUs to periodically access the database [1].
In this paper, we consider a time duration of M periods. In
each period, before accessing the TV channels, the SUs should
connect to the database to obtain a list of available channels.
We assume the total available TV channels in each period have
an expected bandwidth of B and the bandwidth of a channel
is b0. The number of available channels is then B/b0.
B. Pricing Framework
The DO offers two different pricing schemes, the registra-
tion scheme and the service plan scheme, simultaneously.
In the registration scheme, the SUs are registered with a
uniform registration fee r. The DO reserves a fraction of
BR/B (0 ≤ BR ≤ B) of the total TV bandwidth for them
in each period. The expected number of reserved channels is
BR/b0. The DO further divides the reserved channels equally
to serve each registered SU. To make the problem solvable,
in this paper, we consider only uniform registration fee. In
a more flexible setting, the registered SUs can pay different
amount of registration fees and enjoy different shares of the
reserved bandwidth. We also assume an SU can refuse to pay
the registration fee to abort the deal.
In the service plan scheme, the DO offers the SUs several
query plans, which are a set of K +1 query-price combinations
denoted as P = {(qi, pi), i = 0, 1, · · · ,K}. During the M
periods, the SUs with chosen plan (qi, pi) can access the
database qi times with a wholesale price pi. Note that qis
are integers and 0 ≤ qi ≤ M. We assume there is a plan
(q0 = 0, p0 = 0) for SUs choosing neither scheme. The
unregistered SUs shared the unreserved band in a time division
manner. For example, these SUs can leverage CSMA in the
MAC layer for channel access as today’s Wi-Fi.
The pricing procedure is conducted at the beginning of the
M periods and can be viewed as two stages. At stage I, the DO
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Fig. 1: The procedure of pricing and access of TVWS.
announces parameters BR and r for the registration scheme.
Then the SUs decide whether to register. At stage II, the DO
first announces P for all unregistered SUs and then these SUs
specify which particular query plan to buy. An SU can always
choose (q0, p0) to abort the deal.
The procedure of pricing and interactions between the DO
and the SUs are summarized in Fig. 1.
C. DO Model
We assume the DO has two different sources of database
maintenance cost. On one hand, to reserve bandwidth for the
registered SUs, DO needs to pay a bandwidth reservation
fee to the regulators. We assume the cost to reserve b MHz
bandwidth is in the form φ0(b) = 0 ·bα, α ≥ 1. The reservation
cost is a convex function on b. The key reason is that spectrum
bandwidth is a limited resource. Reservation must be approved
by the regulator and there can be multiple databases trying
to reserve bandwidth. When the total demand is higher, the
equilibrium price can be also higher [23]. Furthermore, to
avoid unnecessary reservations, the regulator may consider
charge higher for more reserved bandwidth [5]. On the other
hand, there is also the cost for the DO to calculate the available
bandwidth and respond to the queries of unregistered SUs.
Here we adopt a linear cost function on the query number.
We assume for q queries, the DO has to pay a marginal
maintenance cost φ1(q) = 1 · q.
We define the utility of the DO, denoted by UDO as the
difference between the payment received from all the SUs and
the total cost. For convenience, we assume the number of SUs
choosing query plan i is Ni, (i = 0, 1, · · · ,K), the number of
registered SUs is µ0 and the number of unregistered users is
µ1 then
UDO = µ0 · r +
K∑
i=0
Ni · pi − φ0(BR) − φ1(
K∑
i=0
Ni · qi). (1)
D. SU Model
According to the pricing framework, the SUs choosing the
same pricing scheme share the spectrum evenly. For ui, if there
are X SUs sharing the same bandwidth of W, its capacity
is given by the Shannon-Hartley theorem as: Ci(X,W) =
1
X · W log2
(
1 + S in0
)
, where S i is the average received signal
power over bandwidth W at ui’s receiver, n0 is the average
noise and interference power over the bandwidth. S i relates to
the transmission power of ui and the path loss between ui’s
transmitter and receiver. Without loss of generality, we assume
n0 is identical for all SUs.
We assume SUs have linear valuations for any expected
capacity they achieve. We define the valuation function of ui
as: Vi(X,W) = wiCi(X,W), where wi is the valuation parameter
of ui. wi > 0 and its physical meaning is that the valuation of
the unit channel capacity contributes to the overall benefit. wi
relates to the personal information of ui such as the possible
transmission duration in each period.
We define the utility of ui, denoted as Ui, as the difference
between its valuation of the guaranteed capacity and the price
charged by the DO. If ui chooses the registration scheme, it
can occupy part of the TV bandwidth by itself. Its utility is
Ui = Vi(1,
BR
µ0
) − r = wi · BR
µ0
log2
(
1 +
S i
n0
)
− r.
If ui chooses the service plan scheme, it should share the
bandwidth with other unregistered SUs. There are at most µ1
unregistered SUs sharing, any one of them is guaranteed with a
valuation of Vi(µ1, B−BR) in one access. Moreover, ui can only
access at most q j periods after selecting query plan (q j, p j).
Therefore, its utility is
Ui = Vi(µ1, B − BR) · q jM − p j
= wi · B − BR
µ1
log2
(
1 +
S i
n0
)
· q j
M
− p j.
From the model, we can see that S i, wi are personal
parameters for ui. We further define θi = wi log2
(
1 + S in0
)
as
the type of ui and v(q) = B−BRµ1
1
M q as the valuation of q
queries. The physical meaning of θi is the capacity of ui that
can turn unit bandwidth into revenue. We use ai to denote the
pricing scheme selected by ui. ai = 0 represents the registration
scheme and ai = 1 represents the service plan scheme. The
utility function of ui can be summarized as
Ui =
{ BR
µ0
θi − r, if ai = 0
θiv(q j) − p j, if ai = 1 and the plan is (q j, p j) (2)
We assume there are a total of T different types and we
denote the types by the set Θ = {θ1, θ2, · · · , θT }. Without loss
of generality, we assume 0 < θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θT .
III. Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the pricing problem according
to the two-stage pricing framework.
A. SU Strategy
In this paper, we consider two different cases of SUs based
on their abilities to act strategically.
• Non-strategic SUs: in this case, for ui, ai is fixed before
the pricing procedure. SUs are categorized with pricing
scheme choices. An SU will not change the choice of the
4pricing scheme strategically according to the choices of
other users.
• Strategic SUs: in this case, for ui, ai is not fixed before
the pricing procedure. ui can determine its pricing scheme
dynamically according to the choices of other users.
Actually, we argue that both assumptions are reasonable in
real world. In matured services [21], different pricing schemes
have clear pros and cons. Users tend to have their preferences.
In emerging services, the SUs may have no experiences or
preferences.
In the case of non-strategic SUs, ai is fixed. We assume
the fraction of SUs with type θi choosing ai = 0 is γi (i =
1, · · · ,T ). And we assume the ratio of SUs of type θi among
all SUs is βi. Therefore, the total number of SUs with ai = 0
is N
∑T
i=1 β
iγi and the total number of SUs with ai = 1 is
N
∑T
i=1 β
i(1 − γi).
In the case of strategic SUs, ai is not fixed. SUs strate-
gically choose either pricing scheme considering other SUs’
strategies. Therefore, at stage I, given BR and r, the SUs
compete for pricing schemes. The interactions among the SUs
form a Non-cooperative Database Registration Game (NDRG)
G = (N ,S = {1, 0}, {Ui}ui∈N ), where N is the set of players, S
is the set of strategies, and Ui is the payoff function of play ui.
Let a = (a1, a2, · · · , aN) be the strategy-tuple of all the SUs.
Let a−i = (a1, a2, · · · , ai−1, ai+1, · · · , aN) be the strategy-tuple
of all the SUs expect ui.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium (NE) of NDRG). A strategy
vector a∗ = (a∗1, a
∗
2, · · · , a∗N) is an NE of the game NDRG if
a∗i = argmaxai∈S Ui(ai, a
∗
−i),∀ui ∈ N .
B. Information Scenario
In this paper, we also study the following two different
information scenarios.
• Complete information: in this case, the DO and the SUs
are perfectly informed about the type of each SU.
• Incomplete information: in this case, the DO and the SUs
know only the distribution of the SUs’ types.
In the complete information scenario, the DO can treat each
SU separately and offer a type-specific contract item. However,
in the incomplete information scenario, the DO cannot observe
the type of each SU, it has to offer the same set of query plans
to all SUs.
To tackle the two different information scenarios, we model
the design of query plans with contract theory [8]. The set
of query plans P can be viewed as the set of contact items.
The DO is the seller and the SUs are the buyers. The goods
offered by the seller are the database queries and the wholesale
price for qi queries is pi. The buyers’ types are their private
information. According to the revelation principle [8][9], it
is sufficient to design at most T contract items, one for each
type of the SUs, to enable them to truthfully reveal their types.
Therefore, we assume K = T and an unregistered SU of type
θi will eventually choose plan (qi, pi).
C. Backward Induction for the Two-stage Pricing Framework
Based on the two-stage pricing procedure, the design of
the optimal pricing schemes can be analyzed with backward
induction. More specifically, we first show how should the DO
design the query plans for the SUs at stage II, given BR, r and
SUs’ strategy-tuple a. Then we study how the SUs choose the
pricing scheme given BR, r announced at stage I. Finally, based
on the knowledge of the possible pricing scheme selection of
the SUs, the DO optimally selects BR and r at stage I.
In this paper, we will first consider a baseline scenario where
SUs are non-strategic players and the DO processes complete
information of all the SUs. Then, we extend our analysis to
strategic SUs under both complete and incomplete information
scenarios. By comparing the first and the second scenario, we
show the impact of SU strategy on the pricing design. By
comparing the second and the third scenario, we show the
impact of information completeness. Due to the page limit
and similarity in analysis, we omit the case of non-strategic
SUs under incomplete information.
IV. Pricing Solution for Non-strategic SUs in Complete
Information Scenario
In this section, we consider a baseline case where the SUs
are non-strategic players and the DO has complete information
of all the SUs.
A. SU Behavior Given Pricing Parameters
Since the SUs fix their choices of pricing schemes, we can
analyze the registered and unregistered SUs separately.
At stage I, some SUs with ai = 0 may refuse to pay the
fee if it is too high for them. Given BR and r, ui pays the
registration fee if and only if the following condition holds:
BR
µ∗0
θi − r ≥ 0, where µ∗0 = N
∑T
i=1 β
iγi is the prior knowledge
of the number of registered SUs. Non-strategic SUs decide
whether to pay the fee only based on the prior knowledge.
The actual number of registered SUs can then be calculated
as
µ0 =
∑
i∈
{
i| BR
µ∗0
θi−r≥0
} Nβiγi. (3)
At stage II, there are µ1 = N
∑T
i=1 β
i(1−γi) unregistered SUs.
Since any ui can be guaranteed with non-negative utility by
choosing (q0, p0), to enable ui to select query plan (qi, pi), qi, pi
should satisfy θiv(qi) − pi ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N. The constraints
are usually referred to as the Individual Rationality (IR). The
following lemma says that all the IR constraints are bind under
complete information.
Lemma 1. At stage II, if the DO has complete information
of θi for each ui, the optimal query plan (qi, pi) offered to ui
satisfies: θiv(qi) − pi = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Proof: We prove by contradiction. Suppose in the optimal
pricing design, the DO offers (q∗i , p
∗
i ) to ui at stage II to
optimize UDO and θiv(q∗i ) − p∗i > 0. However, when the DO
increases the price p∗i by ∆p
∗
i = θiv(qi)
∗ − p∗i and keeps all the
other pricing parameters unchanged. UDO can be increased
by ∆p∗i , which contradicts with the optimality of (q
∗
i , p
∗
i ).
Therefore, we must have θiv(q∗i ) − p∗i = 0.
According to Lemma 1, we have:
θiv(qi) − pi = 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N. (4)
5B. Optimal Parameter Selection of DO
By substituting (3) and (4) into (1) we can rewrite UDO as
UDO(BR, r,P) = µ0 · r +
K∑
i=0
Ni pi − φ0(BR) − φ1(
K∑
i=0
Niqi)
=
∑
i∈
{
i| BR
µ∗0
θi−r≥0
} Nβiγi · r − 0BαR
+
T∑
i=1
Nβi
(
1 − γi
) (B − BR
µ1M
θi − 1
)
· qi. (5)
The optimization problem for DO is
max
BR,r,{qi}
UDO(BR, r,P)
subject to: 0 ≤ qi ≤ M(∀1 ≤ i ≤ T ), and 0 ≤ BR ≤ B,
variables: {qi(∀1 ≤ i ≤ T ), BR, r}. (6)
Problem (6) is a non-convex optimization problem and there
is no closed-form solution. The first term
∑
i∈
{
i| BR
µ∗0
θi−r≥0
} Nβiγi
in Eqn. (5) is a piecewise constant function of BR. The M
points r
θi
µ∗0 divide the domain of BR into M + 1 different
intervals. It is a quadratic programming problem to optimize
(5) in each interval. The problem (6) thus can be decomposed
into M + 1 quadratic programming problems, which may be
NP-hard in the general form [24].
Considering the nature of our problem, the physical meaning
of BR is the bandwidth reserved for registered SUs and BR
is measured in channels. The possible values of BR/b0 are
integers in the range [0, B/b0]. Also, we observe that UDO has
a linear relationship for all {qi}, then qi will either be 0 or M.
qi =
{
0 if B−BR
µ1
1
M θ
i − 1 ≤ 0
M otherwise
(7)
Furthermore, the range and scale of the registration price r are
also limited in reality. If we also restrict the range of r to be
[r
¯
, r¯] and its minimum scale to be r0, the DO needs only to
explore a total of BBR ·
r¯−r
¯r0
combinations to find the solution.
In this paper, we will leverage this simpler but efficient two-
dimensional search method to find the pricing parameters.
Therefore DO tries to solve the following optimization
problem
max
BR,r,{qi}
UDO(BR, r,P)
subject to: (7) and 0 ≤ BR ≤ B. (8)
We provide the numerical results in Section VII.
V. Pricing Solution for Strategic SUs in Complete
Information Scenario
In this section, we consider the SUs to be strategic players.
A. Stage II: Optimal Contract Design under Complete Infor-
mation
Same as the case discussed in Section IV, when the DO
processes complete information of the SUs, any SU choosing
the service plan scheme will have zero utility. The contract
items (qi, pi) satisfy the condition in Eqn. (4)
B. Stage I: Database Registration Game of SUs
1) Existence of an NE: At stage I, SUs compete against
each other in the NDRG considering the outcome at stage II
given the parameters BR and r. The utility function of ui can
be rewritten as
Ui(ai, a−i) =
{ BR
µ0
θi − r if ai = 0
0 if ai = 1
(9)
We show that the NDRG under complete information is a
Unweighted Congestion Game [10].
Definition 2 (Unweighted Congestion Game). A non-
cooperative game satisfying the following condition is referred
to as the unweighted congestion game:
• The players share a common set of strategies.
• The payoff the ith player receives for playing the jth
strategy is a monotonically non-increasing function of the
total number µ j of players playing the jth strategy.
Lemma 2. NDRG under complete information is an un-
weighted congestion game.
Proof: It is easy to see that all the players in NSDG share
a common set of strategies S. In the scenario of complete
information, the payoff function of player ui is defined as Ui
in (9). For strategy 1, Ui is constant. For strategy 0, Ui is a
monotonically non-increasing function with µ0.
The nice properties of the unweighted congestion game are
summarized as lemma [10].
Lemma 3. Every unweighted congestion game Γ possesses
an NE in pure strategies. Given an arbitrary strategy-tuple a
in Γ, there exists a best-reply improvement path [10] with L
steps and L ≤ s
(
n+1
2
)
, where s is the number of all strategies
and n is the number of players in Γ.
2) Distributed Database Registration Algorithm: Lemma 3
confirms the existence of an NE in NDRG under complete
information. Starting from any strategy-tuple, an NE can be
achieved with L ≤ s
(
n+1
2
)
steps. In our scenario, s = 2 and
n = N. L is therefore bounded by N(N + 1). Observe that
when selecting the registration scheme, SUs of higher types
have higher utility. When more SUs choosing the registration
scheme, the utility of SUs of lower types becomes non-positive
sooner. Therefore, the best strategy for an SU is to make
sure that no more SUs with higher types will choose the
registration scheme. Otherwise, if an SU chooses registration
and more SUs with higher types also choose, the SU will be
under the risk of non-positive utility. We can then design a
distributed algorithm for SUs to achieve an NE without any
improvement steps. The key idea is to allow the SUs to choose
the registration scheme in a descending order of their types
until no more SUs have incentives to join.
We assume that each SU is assigned a unique ID by the DO
when connecting with the database and it knows the number
of existing registered SUs at stage I, by checking the database.
Without loss of generality, we assume the ID of ui is i. In the
complete information scenario, the SUs know the exact value
of the type and the ID of each other. Therefore, all the SUs can
independently calculate a threshold of user type denoted as θiM .
6Algorithm 1 Distributed Database Registration Algorithm.
1: ai = 1,∀1 ≤ i ≤ N; iM = T ; R = 0;
2: while BRθiM > (R + N · βiM ) · r do
3: R = R + N · βiM ; iM = iM − 1;
4: if iM = 0 then BREAK out of WHILE;
5: end while
6: ai = 0,∀θi > θiM ;
7: for i ∈ {1, · · · ,N} do
8: if θi = θiM and BRθi > (R + 1) · r then
9: R = R + 1; ai = 0;
10: end if
11: end for
When SUs of type higher than θiM are registered, their utilities
are positive. But when SUs with type equal to θiM also register,
these SUs can only have non-positive utility. Therefore, only
part of the SUs with type equal to θiM can choose registration.
After the calculation, the SUs with type higher than θiM then
choose the registration scheme. And the SUs of θiM choose to
register in the order of the assigned ID. Finally the remaining
SUs with even lower types choose the service plan scheme.
The decisions of the SUs are made at the same time. The
procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4. Under complete information, Algorithm 1 is
guaranteed to achieve an NE of NDRG. Its time complexity is
O(N).
Proof: We first prove that all the SUs with the registration
scheme have positive payoffs. In Algorithm 1, suppose the last
SU selecting the registration scheme is ui, ui has positive utility
since BRθi > µ0 · r (µ0 is the final number of registered SUs).
Any other registered SU u j, must has θ j ≥ θi. Therefore, we
have BRθ j ≥ BRθi > µ0 · r.
Then we show that there is no SU with the service plan
scheme has the incentive to change its strategy. Any unreg-
istered SU uk with θk = θi will not change strategy since
the condition BRθk > (µ0 + 1) · r is not satisfied. Therefore,
its payoff will not improve by changing to the registration
scheme. Also, for any other unregistered SU ul with θl < θk,
BRθl ≤ BRθk ≤ (µ0 + 1) · r.
In summary, no player has the incentive to deviate from the
strategy provided by Algorithm 1. It is also easy to see the
number of operations in the algorithm is O(N).
Each SU can independently implement Algorithm 1 by
acquiring the number of currently registered SUs. Note that
the converged NE is not unique if there are multiple SUs with
the same type θiM . Due to the NE output proved in Theorem
4, no SU has the incentive to deviate unilaterally from the
algorithm.
3) Stage I: Optimal Parameter Selection of DO: At stage I,
DO selects pricing parameters considering the NE of NDRG.
From Algorithm 1, DO can get an estimation of µ0 and
µ1 as µ0 = R(BR, r) = R0 + R1, µ1 = N − µ0, where
R0 =
∑T
i=iM+1 N · βi, R1 = arg maxk
{
BRθiM
r > R0 + k
}
and
iM = arg mink
{
BRθk
r >
∑T
i=k N · βi
}
−1. R0 is the total number of
SUs with type larger than θiM . R1 is the number of registered
SUs of type θiM .
Together with Eqn. (4), we can rewrite UDO in (1) as:
UDO(BR, r,P) = (µ0r − 0BαR) + iM−1∑
i=1
Nβi
(
B − BR
µ1M
θi − 1
)
qi
+
(
NβiM − R1
) (B − BR
µ1M
θiM − 1
)
qiM . (10)
Here UDO also has a linear relationship for all {qi},∀i < iM ,
we have:
qi =
{
0 if B−BR
µ1
1
M θ
i − 1 ≤ 0
M otherwise
(11)
The optimization problem for the DO becomes
max
BR,r,{qi}
UDO(BR, r,P)
subject to: (11) and 0 ≤ BR ≤ B. (12)
Similarly, we restrict the range of r to be [r
¯
, r¯] and use a two-
dimensional exhaustive search to find the solution. We provide
the numerical results in Section VII.
VI. Pricing Solution for Strategic SUs in Incomplete
Information Scenario
In this section, we study the pricing problem under incom-
plete information for strategic SUs. Due to hidden information,
at stage II, the DO cannot design query plans for each SU
to extract all their revenue. Instead, the DO should offer a
set of contract items for each type of SUs to choose from.
Since SUs can obtain non-negative utility choosing the service
plan scheme, the analysis of the NDRG will be much more
complicated.
A. Stage II: Contract Design under Incomplete Information
In the incomplete information scenario, to ensure SUs of
type θi have the incentive to select query plan (qi, pi), another
set of constraints called Incentive Compatibility (IC) should
be satisfied:
θiv(qi) − pi ≥ θiv(q j) − p j,∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ T. (13)
The physical meaning of IC is that an SU with type θi achieves
the maximum utility when choosing the corresponding con-
tract item (qi, pi). Note that there are a total of N(N − 1) IC
constraints.
To analyze the design of optimal contract items, we first
relax the condition that qi(1 ≤ i ≤ T ) are integer numbers and
allow qis to be any real number in the range [0,M]. With the
relaxed qis, the optimal contract design problem satisfies the
following condition.
Definition 3 (Spence-Mirrlees Single-crossing Condi-
tion (SMC) [8]). Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition
(SMC) is satisfied if the user’s utility function U(q, p, θ)
satisfies: ∂
∂θ
[
− ∂U/∂q
∂U/∂p
]
> 0, where q is quantity of items, p is
the price for q items and θ is the type of user.
When SMC is satisfied, the N(N − 1) IC constraints can be
reduced to a set of tractable equivalent constraints [8].
7Algorithm 2 Finding Valid Query Sequence.
1: iS (µ1) = T ;
2: while giS (µ1)(µ1) > 0 do
3: iS (µ1) = iS (µ1) − 1;
4: end while
5: qˆi(µ1) = 0,∀i ≤ iS (µ1); qˆi(µ1) = M,∀i > iS (µ1);
Lemma 5. If SMC is satisfied, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the satisfaction of all the IC constraints are:
θ1v(q1) − p1 = 0
θiv(qi) − pi = θiv(qi−1) − pi−1, 1 < i ≤ T
qi ≥ q j where θi ≥ θ j
(14)
It is easy to verify that the SMC condition holds when qis
are real numbers. Based on Lemma 5, introducing a θ0 = 0,
we can express the query plans as{
pk =
∑k
i=1
[
θiv(qi) − θiv(qi−1)
]
, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ T
qi ≥ q j ∀i ≥ j (15)
Substituting (15) and Ni = µ1 ·βi into (1) and putting the terms
related to the same query variable together, we have:
UDO(P) = (µ0r − 0BαR)
+
T∑
i=1
µ1βiθiv(qi) − ∆iv(qi) T∑
j=i+1
µ1β
j − µ1βi1qi

= (µ0r − 0BαR) +
T∑
i=1
gi(µ1)qi,
where ∆i = θi+1 − θi,∀i < T , ∆T = 0 and gi(µ1) = βiθi B−BRM −
∆i B−BRM
∑T
j=i+1 β
j−µ1βi1. The optimal contract design problem
for DO can then be expressed as
UDO(P) = (µ0r − 0BαR) +
T∑
i=1
gi(µ1)qi
max{qi} UDO(P)
subject to: 0 ≤ qi ≤ M, qi ≥ q j, ∀i ≥ j. (16)
Now, we consider qis to be integers. Since factor giqi
only relates to qi given µ1, we can then find the optimal
value for each qi independently. We use q˜i(µ1) to denote
argmax0≤qi≤M giqi. The set of {q˜i(µ1)} can be achieved at the
boundary points (0 or M). It is worth noting that {q˜i(µ1)} is
a function of µ1 since gi is a function of µ1. However, q˜i
may not be monotonically nondecreasing on i (requirement of
Eqn. (14)). For example, if for some i∗, gi∗ > 0 and gi∗+1 < 0
then qi∗ = M and qi∗+1 = 0. We design Algorithm 2 to obtain
valid {qi}. We first find the largest iS (µ1), such that giS (µ1) < 0
and set all q j, j ≤ iS (µ1) to be 0. Note that qis obtained in
Algorithm 2 can be 0 or M, which is the same as that when
qis are real numbers. Therefore, it is valid for us to replace
the IC constraints with Eqn. 14.
Suppose the valid queries obtained are qˆi for type θi SUs,
the optimal query plans at stage II are
P = {(qi, pi)}⋃{(q0 = 0, p0 = 0)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ T
qi = qˆi(µ1)
pi = pˆi(µ1) =
∑i
j=1
[
θ jv(qˆ j(µ1)) − θ jv(qˆ j−1(µ1))
]
Note that Algorithm 2 finds a suboptimal sequence of valid
{qi}. Because Algorithm 2 has restricted the range of {qi} to be
only boundary points. One way to obtain optimal {qi} is the
brunching and ironing algorithm [8]. Instead of restricting the
range of {qi}, this algorithm first finds the optimal sequence of
{qi} ignoring the condition of Eqn. (14). Then it continues to
find pairs of qi, qi+1 with qi < qi+1. After that, it finds a new
q∗i ∈ [qi, qi+1] such that the payoff is maximized when setting
qi = qi+1 = q∗i . It continues until the condition of Eqn. (14) is
satisfied. The algorithm is named since it “iron” out decreasing
sub-sequence in {qi}. However, the optimal algorithm is of high
complexity and cannot guarantee the existence of an NE in
the NDRG at stage I. It is difficult to prove theoretical the gap
between the optimal and suboptimal solution in this paper, we
will evaluate the price of the suboptimal {qi} in Section VII.
B. Stage I: Database Registration Game of SUs
We now consider the NDRG between SUs under incomplete
information scenario.
1) Existence of an NE: At stage II, Algorithm 2 is pub-
lished by the DO to the SUs. Assuming the type of ui is θσ(i),
the utility of ui when choosing the service plan scheme can be
computed as: Ui = θσ(i)v(qˆσ(i)(µ1)) − pˆσ(i)(µ1). Note that µ1 is
the number of SUs choosing the service plan scheme. We can
therefore rewrite the utility of ui considering the two possible
strategies as
Ui(ai, a−i) =
 BRµ0 θi − r if ai = 0θσ(i) B−BR
µ1 M
(qˆσ(i)(µ1)) − pˆσ(i)(µ1) if ai = 1 (17)
From the utility function of ui, we can verify that NDRG under
incomplete information is also a congestion game when using
Algorithm 2 to obtain {qi}.
Lemma 6. NDRG under incomplete information is an un-
weighted congestion game.
Proof: All the players in NSDG share a common set of
strategies S. The payoff function of player ui is defined as Ui
in (17). For strategy 0, Ui is a monotonically non-increasing
function with µ0. For strategy 1, gi(µ1) is a non-increasing
function of µ1. Therefore, iS (µ1) is also a non-increasing
function of µ1. As a result, qˆi(µ1) is a non-increasing function
of µ1. When qˆi(µ1) = 0, Ui = 0 and when qˆi(µ1) = M, Ui ≥ 0.
Therefore Ui is also a monotonically non-increasing function
with µ1.
As a result, we can also find an NE with an improvement
path with a finite number of improvement steps. According to
Lemma 3 and Lemma 6, we have:
Theorem 7. Under incomplete information, NDRG has a pure
strategy NE which can be achieved with an improvement path
of at most N(N + 1) steps starting from any strategy-tuple.
2) Distributed Database Registration Algorithm: In the
case of incomplete information, some SUs of higher types
are guaranteed with non-negative payoff with the service plan
scheme. These SUs may prefer the service plan scheme.
Unlike the complete information case, the SUs now have to
make the pricing scheme choice repeatedly. The SUs can act
8Algorithm 3 Distributed Database Registration Algorithm
under Incomplete Information.
1: SUs randomly select one pricing scheme and record in the
database;
2: DO assigns each SU a unique ID in the range [0,N − 1];
3: Time duration counter t = 0;
4: while a is not an NE do
5: Active SU ID in t is i = t mod N;
6: if Ui(ai, µai ) < Ui(1 − ai, µ1−ai + 1) then
7: Update strategy from ai to 1 − ai within t;
8: end if
9: t = t + 1;
10: end while
according to Algorithm 3 to achieve an NE in a distributed
manner via repeated improvements. Algorithm 3 is based on
the improvement path. Since all the SUs are connected with
the database, we assume at stage I, the SUs are synchronized
with the database. Also, we assume there are predefined time
slots. SUs can determine whether to change their strategies
within a time slot one by one according to the order of their
assigned IDs. In each time slot, only one SU may update his
strategy to optimize its own utility given the new situation of
other SUs’ choices. It is easy to see that in Algorithm 3, every
update is a step in the improvement path. Therefore, Algorithm
3 is guaranteed to find an NE within N(N + 1) updates. Note
that the found NE by the algorithm is also not unique if there
are many SUs with the same type.
C. Stage I: Optimal Parameter Selection of DO
1) Estimate the SUs’ choices in an NE: Estimating µ0 and
µ1 is essential for the DO to optimize its pricing parameters.
However, due to the randomness of the SUs’ strategies the NE
found by Algorithm 3 is not unique. Therefore, it is impossible
to get an accurate estimation. We assume the DO uses the
expected value as an estimation of µ0 and µ1. However,
to calculate the expectation, the DO needs to generate all
possible strategy-tuples and check all possible NEs. Therefore
the DO has to generate 2N different strategy-tuples, which is
computationally infeasible. However, by exploring the nature
of SUs in our scenario, we are able to dramatically reduce
the computation complexity of the DO. The following lemma
provides a way for the DO to estimate µ0 and µ1 with linear
complexity with N.
Lemma 8. For every NE strategy-tuple a, there exists another
NE a¯ with the same number of registered SUs. In a¯, there
is only one θiS , 1 ≤ iS ≤ T, such that ∀i , iS ,∀u j, uk, if
θ j = θk = i, a j = ak.
Proof: Suppose in an NE, two of the user types are θi
and θ j and the strategy tuple is a. Suppose n0i of the θ
i users
are choosing 0 and n1i of the θ
i SUs are choosing 1. n0j of the
θ j SUs are choosing 0 and n1j of the θ
j SUs are choosing
1. Assume one θi SU ui changes its strategy from 0 to 1
and one θ j SU u j changes its strategy from 1 to 0 at the
same time. After the above strategy inter-changing, the strategy
Algorithm 4 Estimating the SUs’ Strategy under Incomplete
Information.
1: Multi-set RALL = {}; // all possible values of µ0
2: for Each user type θi do
3: for Counter=1 to 2T do
4: a−i= the bits in Counter’s binary representation;
5: Assign strategy of SUs with type θ , θi with a−i;
6: for j = 0 to N · βi do
7: Let j of the type θi SUs choose 0;
8: Let N · βi − j of the type θi SUs choose 1;
9: if It is an NE then RALL = RALL
⋃{current µ0};
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: µ0 = the most common value in the multi-set RALL;
14: µ1 = N − µ0;
tuple, denoted as a′ is also an NE. That is because µ0 and µ1
are the same in both a and a′. And none of the other SUs
except ui and u j will have the incentive to change strategy in
the previous NE tuple a. We can also see that ui and u j have
no incentive to change strategies since no other θi and θ j SUs
want to change from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0.
Similarly, another equivalent NE can be achieved if some
of the type θi SUs change from 1 to 0 and some of the type
θ j SUs change from 0 to 1 at the same time. By interchanging
strategy choices of SUs in an NE scenario, we can obtain an
NE tuple a¯ in which there is at most one type of SUs, say, iS ,
satisfying the conditions in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 says all SUs with the same type other than the
type θiS have the same strategies in a¯. As a result, the DO
can use Algorithm 4 to estimate the number of µ0 and µ1. It
first chooses one type to be the θiS and generates all possible
strategy combinations of the other types. Then the DO checks
whether it is possible to be an NE under the chosen θiS by
varying the number of θiS type SUs’ choices on strategy 0
and 1. In the algorithm, the DO only needs to check no more
than 2T · N different strategy-tuples which is linear with N.
2) Optimization Parameter Selection: Utilizing the estima-
tion of µ0 and µ1 obtained from Algorithm 4, the DO now
needs to solve the following optimization problem:
UDO(BR, r) = (µ0(BR, r)r − 0BαR) +
T∑
i=1
gi(BR, r)qˆi(BR, r)
maxBR,r UDO(BR, r)
subject to: 0 ≤ BR ≤ B. (18)
where gi(BR, r) = Nβiθi B−BRµ1(BR,r)M − ∆i B−BRµ1(BR,r)M
∑T
j=i+1 Nβ
j −
Nβi1. Note that qˆi is a function of BR, r. Again, the problem
can be solved using two-dimensional exhaustive search to find
the solution when we restrict the range of r to be [r
¯
, r¯]. We
provide numerical results in Section VII.
VII. Numerical Results
In this section, we use numerical results to evaluate the pro-
posed hybrid pricing scheme. We first introduce the simulation
setup and then discuss the results.
9TABLE II: N = 100 SUs in T = 10 types.
θi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Distr. 1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Distr. 2 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Distr. 3 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1
Distr. 4 2 6 10 14 18 18 14 10 6 2
Distr. 5 18 14 10 6 2 2 6 10 14 18
A. Simulation Setup
We assume there are a total of N = 100 − 1000 SUs in
the network. The default value of N is 100. There are M =
100 periods. The expected available TVWS is B = 60 MHz
[11][12] We assume there are T = 5 − 30 types, with 10 as
the default value. For T = 10, we generate 5 different possible
type distributions summarized in table II. For all T = 5 − 30,
we also have a random type distribution where the number of
SUs in each type is randomly generated.
When applying a two-dimensional search, we need to fix the
range of r. Recall that r is the money paid by the registered
SUs to the DO. When BR = 60, µ0 = 1, the highest revenue
a SU can obtain is BR/µ0 × θ10 = 600. So r should be within
[0, 600]. We assume the smallest change in r is r0 = 1 unit.
We assume the total TV bandwidth can only be allocated in
the unit of b0 = 6 MHz (the same as the spectrum span of
a TV channel in the US). So the possible values of BR are
{0, 6, 12, · · · , 60}.
For the database maintenance cost we set α = 1.2 in φ0(b) =
0 · bα and we vary the parameter 0 in the range [0, 7]. If 0
is too high, DO will not have the incentive to consider the
registration scheme. Since the marginal cost of one database
access is very small compared with the bandwidth reservation
cost, we set the default value of 1 to be 0.
In the case of non-strategic SUs, we assume γis are the
same among all types. We use a single value γ to denote the
fraction of SUs preferring the registration scheme. We will set
γ to be either 0.2 or 0.5 in our simulations.
In this section, for convenience we refer to the Complete
Information Scenario as CIS and the Incomplete Information
Scenario as IIS.
B. Simulation Results
1) Impact of SU strategy: In this section, we compare the
two cases: non-strategic SUs in CIS and strategic SUs in CIS
to show the impact of SU strategy on the pricing solution.
First, in Fig. 2, we fixed the SU type distribution to be
Distr. 1. We set 1 to be either 0.05 or 0.1. We then vary
the reservation cost 0 and plot the optimal BR obtained from
three cases: non-strategic SUs with γ = 0.2, non-strategic
SUs with γ = 0.5 and strategic SUs, all under CIS. From
Fig. 2, we can see that with non-strategic SUs, the DO tends
to reserve less bandwidth for the reservation scheme under
the same 0 and 1. That is because when the SUs are non-
strategic players, they decide whether to pay the registration
fee only based on the prior knowledge of the number of SUs
in the registration scheme which is predetermined. Therefore,
many SUs will overestimate the registration fee, so that the DO
cannot increase the registration fee to obtain higher profit. As
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Fig. 2: Impact of SU strategy on bandwidth reservation.
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Fig. 3: Impact of SU strategy on utility.
a result, the DO prefers the service plan scheme and reserves
less bandwidth.
Second, in Fig. 3, we fixed the SU type distribution to be
Distr. 1 and set 1 to be 0.05. We vary the reservation cost
0 and plot the utility of DO and the average utility of SUs
given the optimal pricing parameters. From Fig. 3a, we can
see that in both scenarios, the DO utility first decreases and
then remains the same after BR = 0. When 0 is higher, the
DO utility in the non-strategic scenario is higher compared
with that in the strategic SU scenario. That’s because when
0 is higher, in the strategic scenario, the profit DO makes
from the registered SUs become smaller however, most of
DO profit in the non-strategic SU scenario comes from the
non-registered SUs. We can also see from Fig. 3b that when
SUs are strategically player, their average utility are still non-
zero when 0 > 0.5. That is because, in the non-strategic SU
scenario, when 0 > 0.5, BR = 0, all SUs can only get zero
utility. However, in the strategic SU scenario, some SUs can
choose the registered scheme to obtain non-zero utility. From
the comparison, we can conclude that with more intelligent
SU strategy, SUs achieve higher average utility.
2) Benefit of Hybrid Pricing Scheme: We compared the
DO’s revenue when applying hybrid and uniform pricing
schemes. There are two uniform pricing schemes: registration
only or service plan only. We set epsilon0 = 3.0. In the case
of registration scheme only, BR = 60 while in the case of
service plan scheme only, BR = 0. We show the maximum
possible revenues the DO can obtain in type distributions 1-3
and random distribution in Fig. 4. The results from random
distribution is an average of 100 runs. We can see that the
hybrid pricing scheme provides higher revenue for the DO.
By offering hybrid pricing schemes, the DO has a new degree
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Fig. 6: Impact of information.
of freedom to tune the bandwidth segmentation to increase
its profit. We will evaluate the impact of epsilon0 in the next
evaluation.
3) Impact of the bandwidth reservation cost: To show
the impact of the bandwidth reservation cost on the optimal
bandwidth reservation BR, we vary 0 from 0 to 5.2 and plot
the optimal BR under each 0 in both CIS and IIS in Fig. 5a
and Fig. 5b, respectively. In both information scenarios, BR
decreases with the increase of 0. That is because with greater
0, the reservation cost for the same bandwidth is higher, so the
DO prefers to allocate more bandwidth for unregistered users.
We can see that when 0 ≥ 5.2, BR = 0 for all cases, which
means no bandwidth is reserved for the registration scheme.
We can also observe from Fig. 5 that in Distr. 2 BR decreases
the fastest among the three distributions. That is because in
Distr. 2, there are more SUs of higher types, who are more
likely to have gi > 0 in Eqn. (18), thus DO can benefit more
from the service plan scheme.
It is also worth noting that in the CIS, BR decreases to zero
sooner compared with that in the IIS. That is because in CIS,
DO can design the query plans for individual unregistered SUs
to make more profit.
4) Impact of the DO’s knowledge of SUs’ personal infor-
mation: In Fig. 6, we show the impact of the DO’s knowledge
of the SUs’ personal information on the utility of the DO and
the SUs. The SUs’ types are set to distribution 1.
We can see from Fig. 6a that the DO has higher utility in
the CIS than that in the IIS, when 0 ≥ 1.7. That is because
when 0 ≥ 1.7, BR < 60 in CIS. As a result, the bandwidth
for the service plan scheme is non-zero and the DO can make
more revenue from unregistered SUs in the CIS.
We can see from Fig. 6b that the SUs have higher average
utility in the IIS than that in CIS, when 0 > 2.7. That’ because
when 0 > 2.7, BR < 60 in IIS. As a result, the bandwidth for
the service plan scheme is non-zero and the SUs can get non-
negative utility when choosing the service plan scheme.
We can also notice that when 0 < 1.7 in Fig. 6a and when
0 < 2.7 in Fig. 6b, BR = 60, which means all bandwidth
is reserved for registered SUs. As the DO design registration
scheme to admit only registered SUs with the highest type,
the utilities obtain in both information scenario are the same.
In summary, with more knowledge of the SUs’ information,
the DO enjoys higher utility. On the other hand, the hidden
information provides the SUs higher utility.
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Fig. 7: Query plans under different SU type distributions.
5) Impact of the SUs’ type distribution: To show the impact
of the SUs’ type distribution on the contract design, we fixed
BR = 30, r = 200, 0 = 3.0 and compute the qi and pi in
the service plans for 50 unregistered SUs in the 5 different
SU type distributions. Note that the parameters may not be
the optimal pricing parameters for each distribution, the use
of the same parameters for all the distributions allows us to
see the impact of SU type distribution separately. Fig. 7 shows
the results for qi and pi. In Fig. 7a, we can see that when the
number of SUs of lower types is higher, (compared distr. 3
and distr. 1), DO tends to assign non-zero queries for lower
type SUs. That is because a query qi is determined by a factor
of
∑T
j=i+1 Nβ
j in Eqn. (18). In Fig. 7b we can see that if non-
zero qi is assigned to a lower type, a lower price pi should be
charged. This is because, the price should follow the individual
rationality constraint (Eqn. (4)) for such SUs.
6) Impact of the suboptimal query assignment: We im-
plemented the brunching and ironing algorithm [8] for the
contract design. We assume at stage I, the DO and the SUs
still use Algorithm 2 to estimate the contracts to ensure the
existence of an NE. We generate random SU type distributions
with N = 100, T = 5−30 and set BR = 0, which indicates that
all the N SUs choose the service plan scheme. We repeated
the test for 100 times. We show the average utility of the DO
obtained from query assignment algorithms in Fig. 8. For a
different T , Algorithm 2 achieves the DO utility within 90%
of that obtained from the optimal algorithm.
7) Convergence time to an NE under incomplete infor-
mation scenario: To check the convergence time to NE
via Algorithm 3, we fix BR = 30, r = 200 and generate
N = 100 − 1000 SUs with uniformly distributed types. Under
each N, we repeat Algorithm 3 200 times. Fig. 9 shows the
average steps of improvement needed to achieve an NE. It
is clear that the number of steps is bounded by N · (N + 1),
which verifies Theorem 7. We may prove a tighter bound for
the convergence time in our future work.
VIII. Discussion and Future Works
In this paper, to make the problem solvable, we have made
several simplifications in the system model. There are several
interesting ways to further extend this work.
First, the registration scheme considered in this paper admits
a uniform registration fee. In a more flexible setting, the
registered SUs can pay different amounts of registration fees
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Fig. 5: Impact of bandwidth reservation cost.
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Fig. 9: Convergence time to
an NE under IIS.
and enjoy different shares of the reserved bandwidth. Similarly
with the query plan scheme, the DO can offer several levels
of registration fees.
Second, the pricing framework considered in this paper is
not dynamic. The pricing parameters are determined at the
beginning once and will not change. In a more dynamic
setting, the DO can redesign new pricing parameters for
the following time durations and the SUs can also re-select
the pricing scheme given the observation in previous time
durations and the newly announced pricing parameter. In this
case, the interactions between the DO and the SUs become
a repeated game. Also, the SUs may dynamically join and
leave the query plan. Therefore, the SUs should consider
the expectation of future SU behaviors when choosing their
pricing schemes.
IX. Related Works
Most existing works on geo-location databases can be
classified into two categories. Some works focus on the design
of geo-location database to protect primary users. In [13],
Gurney et al. discussed the methods to calculate the protection
area for TV stations. In [14], Murty et al. designed a database-
driven white space network based on measurement studies and
terrain data. Some other works focused on the networking
issue with the assumption that the database is already set up.
In [6], Feng et al. presented a white space system utilizing a
database. In [15], Chen et al. considered the channel selection
and access point association problem. One recent work [16]
also address the business model related to the geo-location
database. In [16], the authors proposed that the geo-location
database acts as a spectrum broker reserving the spectrum from
spectrum licensees. They considered only one pricing scheme
which is similar to the registration scheme discussed in our
paper. Compared to our previous work [22], in this paper, we
further extend the scenario to non-strategic SUs and compared
the pricing schemes with non-strategic and strategic SUs under
complete information scenario. We also extend our theoretical
analysis and numerical evaluations.
Many works also focus on the economic issue of dynamic
spectrum sharing. In [18], the pricing-based spectrum access
control is investigated under secondary users competitions.
In [19], spectrum pricing with spatial reuse is considered.
Contract theory is utilized in the scenarios where the spectrum
buyers have hidden information. In [17], Gao et al. leveraged
contract theory to analyze the spectrum trading between pri-
mary operator and SUs. In [20], contract theory is applied to
the cooperative communication scenario. In this paper, we also
model the service plan design with contract theory. However,
due to the co-existence of hybrid pricing schemes, there is
uncertainty about the number of SUs choosing the contract
items, which is different from existing works.
There are some works focus on the hybrid pricing of other
limited resources. In [21]. Wang et.al study the problem of
capacity segmentation for two different pricing schemes for
cloud service providers. One key difference between our work
and [21] is that the strategic SUs considered in our paper can
dynamically choose between pricing schemes. While in [21],
the users are pre-categorized into different pricing scheme
before designing the pricing schemes.
X. Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a hybrid pricing model for TVWS
database. The SUs can choose between the registration and the
service plan scheme. We investigate scenarios where the SUs
can be either non-strategic or strategic players and the DO has
either complete and incomplete information of the SUs. In the
non-strategic SU scenario, we model the competitions among
the SUs as non-cooperative game and prove the existence of
an NE in two different scenarios by showing that the game
is an unweighted congestion game. We model the pricing for
unregistered SUs with contract theory and derive suboptimal
query plans for different types of SUs. Based on the SUs’
pricing scheme choices, the DO optimally determines the
12
bandwidth segmentation and pricing parameters to maximize
its profit. We have conducted extensive simulations to obtain
numerical results and verify our theoretical claims.
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